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SYMPOSIUM ARTICLES
PRESERVING THE LEGACY: A TRIBUTE TO CHIEF
JUSTICE HARRY L. CARRICO, ONE WHO EXALTED
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
The Honorable Penny J. White *
PART ONE: WORDS HONORING CHIEF JUSTICE CARRICO'
It is a great honor to be among those addressing today's topic
in tribute to Chief Justice Harry L. Carrico. It is an honor be-
cause of the reverence and respect with which I and countless
others hold Chief Justice Carrico and the principle of judicial in-
dependence, both of which we celebrate today.
Between 1996 and 2001, I spoke on the topic of judicial inde-
pendence more than fifty times, in dozens of states, before law-
yers, judges, and citizens. I decried what I characterized as the
"attack" on the independence of the judiciary, citing the Judge
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Tennessee College of Law. B.S., 1978,
East Tennessee State University; J.D., 1981, University of Tennessee; LL.M., 1987,
Georgetown University. Professor White is a former trial and appellate judge, and former
Tennessee Supreme Court justice.
1. The first part of this article is a speech given on March 21, 2003, at the University
of Richmond School of Law at a Symposium on Judicial Independence, held in commemo-
ration of Chief Justice Harry L. Carrico on the occasion of his retirement from the Su-
preme Court of Virginia, after more than three decades of distinguished service. I am es-
pecially indebted to Chief Justice Carrico and Justice Donald Lemons of the Supreme
Court of Virginia for inviting me to participate in the Symposium and to my colleagues at
the University of Tennessee College of Law who provided an engaging, lively debate (as
usual) of my planned comments. A special debt of gratitude is owed to Professor Otis
Stephens for his counsel.
615
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
Harold Baer impeachment rhetoric,2 the United States Congress's
actions and inaction on countless judicial nominees, and my own
retention nightmare3 quite often as examples. I wrote articles
that proclaimed that an America without judicial independence
was one in which we would not want to live, for it would be one
without equal opportunity, without respect for constitutional
freedoms, and without equal justice under the law.4
In an effort to educate the citizenry about the role of judges and
how that role differed from the role of members of the legislative
and executive branches, I co-opted the explanation given by Jus-
tice Felix Frankfurter that "[c]ourts are not representative bod-
ies ... [and] are not designed to be a good reflex of a democratic
society.... Their essential quality is detachment, founded on
independence."5 I added my own opinion that, before a court can
mete out equal justice, the court must be impartial; and that es-
sential to impartiality is independence. The Constitution and the
laws of this country, and of the individual states, establish rights
for individuals that remain despite the current desire of the ma-
jority. Judges must give meaning to those rights, but they may be
unable to do so if they are enslaved to and controlled by the ma-
jority.6
I encouraged judges to exercise independence by reminding
them of the significance with which the framers viewed an inde-
pendent judiciary. I quoted John Marshall in attendance at the
Virginia Constitutional Convention who proclaimed so eloquently:
2. Judge Harold Baer, Jr.'s decision on January 22, 1996, to suppress physical evi-
dence of eighty pounds of cocaine and heroin, United States v. Bayless, 913 F. Supp. 232,
234 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), vacated 921 F. Supp. 211, 212 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), prompted more than
200 members of Congress to sign a letter written to President Clinton asking for the res-
ignation of Judge Baer. The controversy that ensued sparked discussion on the topic of
judicial independence. See Judge Harold Baer, Jr., Interview: A Unique Perspective on Ju-
dicial Independence, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 799 (1997); Jon 0. Newman, The Judge Baer
Controversy, 80 JUDICATURE 156 (1997).
3. See, e.g., Colloquium, Breaking the Most Vulnerable Branch: Do Rising Threats to
Judicial Independence Preclude Due Process in Capital Cases?, 31 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 123, 137-41 (1999) (discussing White's retention controversy).
4. See, e.g., Penny J. White, Judging Judges: Securing Judicial Independence by Use
of Judicial Performance Evaluations, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1053 (2002) [hereinafter
Judging Judges]; Penny J. White, An America Without Judicial Independence, 80
JUDICATURE 174 (1997); Penny J. White, If Justice Is for All, Who Are Its Constituents?, 64
TENN. L. REV. 259 (1997); Penny J. White, It's a Wonderful Life, or Is It? America Without
Judicial Independence, 27 U. MEM. L. REV. 1 (1996).
5. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 525 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
6. See Judging Judges, supra note 4, at 1056-57.
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"I have always thought, from my earliest youth.., that the
greatest scourge an angry Heaven ever inflicted upon an ungrate-
ful and a sinning people, was an ignorant, a corrupt, or a depend-
ent Judiciary."' I reminded judges of other great Virginians, like
James Madison who characterized "independent tribunals of jus-
tice" as "an impenetrable bulwark against every assumption of
power [by] the Legislative or Executive" branches.' And I read
them The Federalist No. 78, in which Alexander Hamilton wrote:
In a monarchy Uudicial independence] is an excellent barrier to the
despotism of the prince: In a republic it is a no less excellent barrier
to the encroachments and oppressions of the representative body.
And it is the best expedient which can be devised in any government
to secure a steady, upright and impartial administration of the
laws.
9
Often I left the judges, whose jobs I envied and whose charac-
ters I trusted, with a challenge, not my words, but the words of
another judge, who said that, "in dangerous times ... [i]t... be-
comes the duty of the judiciary calmly to poise the scales of jus-
tice, unmoved by the arm of power, undisturbed by the clamor of
the multitude."10 The current attack on the independence of the
judiciary, I often said, made these dangerous times indeed.
As much as I envisioned judges as courageous soldiers hoisting
the scales of justice with impeccable balance-"nice, clear and
true," in the words of the Supreme Court'-I came to envision
the attack on the independence of the judiciary as a swinging
pendulum, back and forth, with the principle under attack, at
risk, or secure. Perhaps had I begun my own tutorial in judicial
independence after the tragedy of September 11, rather than a
pendulum I would have envisioned a color-coded escalating scale,
with yellow, orange, and red indicating the degree of alert.
7. John Marshall, Address to the Virginia State Convention of 1829-1830, in 2
PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE VIRGINIA STATE CONVENTION OF 1829-1830, at 619
(1971).
8. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 439 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (remarks of James Madison,
June 8, 1789).
9. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 522 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
10. United States v. Bollman, 24 F. Cas. 1189, 1192 (C.C.D.C. 1807) (No. 14,622)
(Cranch, C.J.).
11. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927) (stating that "[elvery procedure which
would offer a possible temptation to the average man as a judge to forget the burden of
proof required to convict the defendant, or which might lead him not to hold the balance
nice, clear and true between the State and the accused, denies the latter due process of
law" (emphasis added)).
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This symbol of the pendulum came as a result of my own edu-
cation efforts. The proximity of my personal experience to the
then onslaught of attacks on the independence of the judiciary
made the attack seem, to me, catastrophic. Through research,
and the objectivity that is gained by time and distance, I came to
realize that throughout our history the judiciary has been tested,
assailed, and attacked, and that each time it has withstood the
challenge and remained that separate, independent guardian
calmly balancing the scales nice, clear, and true. Through this
educational process, I found solace and was comforted in my be-
lief that the pendulum would soon rest again, at least for a while,
with judicial independence secure.
At least three times during those five years, I spoke in Virginia
to judges and bar associations. While they welcomed my message
on those occasions, each time they assured me that the distasteful
plight suffered by many judges in states where judges were
elected or retained by the electorate would not befall them. They
were not intertwined with partisan politics; they did not have to
finance campaigns; they were not challenged to respond to special
interest groups; nor did they fear that some group would mis-
characterize them in the media just before review and retention. I
was told repeatedly and consistently by Virginia judges, and
judges from the other ten states which neither elect nor retain
their judges by popular vote, that their selection and retention
methods insulated them from these distasteful political attacks.12
In Virginia, the legislature, which conducted the review and re-
tention process, was more informed about the proper role of
judges; they understood the separation of powers, the importance
of judicial independence. They would not succumb to politicizing
the judiciary. In Virginia, and these other states, the pendulum
was perpetually at rest.
Today, we celebrate the life work of a product of that lauded
Virginia system, a judge who not only exercised judicial inde-
pendence, but exalted it; and as we honor him and the principle
that he embodied, it is altogether appropriate to assess my pen-
dulum. Is it at rest, indicating that judicial independence in the
12. See Alex B. Long, An Historical Perspective on Judicial Selection Methods in Vir-
ginia and West Virginia, 18 J.L. & POL. 691, 702-11 (2002) (discussing the judicial selec-
tion methods of other states).
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states is a secure principle, not under attack or at risk? Or is it
swinging wildly, indicating an elevated or high state of alert?
In state after state, the selection of judges is being hijacked by
money interests, partisan politics, and special interest agendas
that have no place in our system of government. 3 Here are some
examples of what is accurately described as bare-knuckle, back-
room judicial politics, from newspapers and news magazines in
the last year:
Editorials that pose these questions to citizens:
Do you want a court that will stack the deck against small busi-
nesses?;
What about one that will pad the wallets of plaintiff's attor-
neys?;
Do you want a judge who is a drug dealer's dream?;
Articles, written by medical doctors, soliciting donations so that we
can keep courts that support our medical profession by enforcing
strict limits on pain and suffering jury awards;
14
And advertisements for candidates who promise to ban most abor-
tions and protect a citizen's right to carry a gun.15
Justice, it seems, may be blind; but make no mistake, justice is
not cheap. Years ago when first I became a student of threats to
the independence of the judiciary, I read that the U.S. Chamber
of Commerce had begun a campaign to capitalize on America's fa-
vorite pastime-lawyer bashing. Since then, the Chamber has
graduated from attacking the bar to attempting to buy the bench,
pledging this year to raise $40 million to help elect what the
Chamber considers "business-friendly judges," rated by the
13. Editorial, Sleazemongers, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Nov. 1, 2002, at 14A. The article
speaks of "sleazemongers" running advertisements in the races for the Supreme Court of
Ohio: Citizens for an Independent Court and Consumers for a Fair Court sponsored adver-
tisements targeting incumbent judges, and the editorial argues that the goal of these
groups is "a court that will stack the deck against businesses and that pads the wallets of
plaintiffs' attorneys who grow rich off fat contingency fees." Id. See also Kara Baker,
Comment, Is Justice for Sale in Ohio? An Examination of Ohio Judicial Elections and
Suggestions for Reform Focusing on the 2000 Race for the Ohio Supreme Court, 35 AKRON
L. REV. 159, 159-68 (2001).
14. See David Barnhizer, "On The Make": Campaign Funding and the Corrupting of
the American Judiciary, 50 CATH. U. L. REV. 361, 393-94 (2001) (describing the incentive
for doctors to make campaign contributions to trial-level judges).
15. See id. at 388-89, 397-98 (discussing the impact of the abortion debate on judicial
elections and the way judicial candidates send messages to voters indicating their posi-
tions on certain controversial issues).
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Chamber's business friendly report card.16 Translated, that
means how many times the judge ruled in favor of or against a
business in lawsuits. Simplified, that means to ace the Chamber's
test you rule for business, the facts and the law notwithstanding.
The business of electing judges has become a financial arms
race with a fallout every bit as disastrous to society as a military
arms race. It is a financial arms race to elect judges in which only
very heavy hitters are able to compete.
A state-wide industry involved in a major lawsuit headed to the
state supreme court, raised almost $300,000, ran a candidate
against an incumbent, flew the candidate to appearances in the
industry jet, and won-both at the polls on election day and in
the supreme court on appeal when the lower court's judgment
against the industry was reversed, 4-3, with the deciding vote
cast by the new justice." And in the nature of a Louisiana la-
gniappe, that little something extra, the court authorized an in-
vestigation of plaintiffs' counsel, a law school legal clinic,18 and
ultimately altered the rule that governs their ability to litigate
cases in the state courts.19 So successful was this effort that it is
being used as a model for piggyback campaigns between cham-
bers of commerce and select industries in other states. 2
In another state, a trial judge and his supporters decided to
pad his war chest and retire campaign debt by selling sponsor-
ships to his induction ceremony.21 That, of course, is the ceremony
at which the judge swears to uphold the constitution. For a few
thousand dollars, the sponsors will have their names listed on the
invitation as sponsors of the ceremony-or of the judge?
16. See Shawn Zeller, Tort Reform's Massive War Chest, 35 NATL J. 1008 (2003) (dis-
closing expenditures on lobbying by the Chamber's Institute for Legal Reform of over $22
million in 2002, and a budget of $40 million for 2003); Peter H. Stone, The Blitz to Elect
Business-Friendly Judges, 34 NAT'L J. 480 (2002).
17. Sheila Kaplan & Zoe Davidson, The Buying of the Bench, 266 NATION 11, 14
(1998) (discussing Louisiana for Business and Industry's (LABI) sponsorship of Louisiana
Supreme Court candidate Chet Taylor).
18. Id. at 15.
19. See Robert R. Kuehn, Denying Access to Legal Representation: The Attack on the
Tulane Environmental Law Clinic, 4 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 33, 69 (2000) (stating that the
chief justice of the Louisiana Supreme Court placed restrictions on Louisiana law clinics
that prevented the Tulane clinic from representing community groups in certain situa-
tions).
20. Kaplan & Davidson, supra note 17, at 15.
21. Id. at 14.
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It is not just judicial elections and the related financial atroci-
ties that suggest that the symbolic pendulum is neither at rest,
nor secure. A week ago, the American Bar Association's ("ABA")
Commission on the 21st Century Judiciary released a draft report
for the National Colloquium on the 21st Century Judiciary.22 The
headline for an article concerning the draft was a fair summary of
the report: Commission Warns That State Court Systems Are at
Risk.23 The elaboration was no more subtle: "state courts are on
the brink of a crisis" because of the "escalating partisan battle[s]"
being waged for their control.24 State courts must be inoculated
not only from the toxic effects of money, but also from political
partisanship and special interests.
This unhealthy nexus between judging and politics is evident
in op-eds that fault Democratic judges for violent crimes, but
credit Republican courts as responsible for falling crime rates be-
cause the judges' Republican ideologies cause them to get crimi-
nals off the street and into jails.25
Playing partisan politics with the judiciary is a favorite sport of
the other branches. Regardless of the outcome, the public loses
when judges feel pressure to rule based on so-called ideology,
rather than the facts or the law. Recent examples include subject-
ing judges to demeaning, personal inquiries under the guise of
reviewing their fitness for the bench, questioning a judge's adher-
ence to rarely enforced state morality laws, and investigating
judges whose rulings have advocated fairness for lesbian par-
ents.26
22. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION COMMISSION ON THE 21ST CENTURY JUDICIARY,
JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY (2003), at http://www.law.uc.edu/current/jud0311O6/justjeop.pdf (last
visited Jan. 22, 2004) [hereinafter JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY]; JUSTICE AT STAKE CAMPAIGN,
ABA COLLOQUIUM ON THE 21ST CENTURY JUDICIARY: COMMISSION WARNS THAT STATE
COURT SYSTEMS ARE AT RISK, RECOMMENDS SINGLE TERM FOR STATE JUDGES, at
http://www.justiceatstake.org/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2004).
23. JUSTICE AT STAKE CAMPAIGN, supra note 22.
24. Id.
25. See Pete Slover, All-GOP Criminal Appeals Court Faces Stiff Test; Focus on Fair-
ness in Death-Penalty Cases Puts Races in Spotlight, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 15,
2000, at 41A (commenting on the public perception that a Republican court is biased to-
ward the prosecution).
26. See Douglas W. Kmiec, Judicial Selection and the Pursuit of Justice: The Unset-
tled Relationship Between Law and Morality, 39 CATH. U. L. REV. 1, 13-18 (1989) (discuss-
ing the questions asked to judicial nominees during the Reagan administration). But see
William G. Ross, The Supreme Court Appointment Process: A Search for a Synthesis, 57
ALB. L. REV. 993, 1004-14 (1994) (approving generally of questioning judicial nominees on
their political views).
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Those who apply an ideological test for judges make a faulty
assumption that all judges can be placed on an ideology-based
continuum ranging from the most conservative to most liberal,
based on the judges' personal beliefs and philosophies, and that
the placement will accurately predict the judges' rulings. The as-
sumption is false in almost every regard, including the assump-
tion that judges judge based on personal opinions. As judges
know, their personal opinions are not relevant to what is required
by the law or the evidence. A judge cannot reinterpret the law in
favor of his or her own private opinions or prejudices.
While a legislative or executive office holder may be swayed-
in fact, arguably should be swayed by public opinion-the out-
come of a judicial decision cannot depend on its popularity or
even its acceptance. It is common for courts to be pressured to
behave less like courts, to act less independently, to be more re-
sponsive to the immediate needs of the majority. But nothing
could be more antithetical to the role of the courts. Resisting the
pressure to please the majority is the greatest strength, not the
weakness of the judiciary.
When political pressure, be it partisan or special interest group
initiated, is brought to bear on a judge in order to secure a certain
judicial ruling, justice has been denied. More importantly, the
people have lost. Those who would tinker with judicial independ-
ence may gain a momentary political victory, but they will also
cause a great and lasting loss to our system of justice and to the
rule of law.
In many states, special interest groups hide under names like
Citizens for Independent Courts and Citizens for Fair and Inde-
pendent Justices.27 The former is a group of labor unions and trial
lawyers, the latter an organization of insurance companies and
big businesses.2" Another, the United Seniors Association, is ac-
tually a group of supporters of pharmaceutical companies.2 While
all are entitled to organize and express their preferences, why
they assume such community-conscious titles is a bit confusing.
The confusion clears when research discloses that, in addition to
27. Kaplan & Davidson, supra note 17, at 16.
28. Id.
29. PUBLIC CITIZEN'S CONGRESS WATCH, UNITED SENIORS ASSOCIATION: HIRED GUNS
FOR PHRMA AND OTHER CORPORATE INTERESTS, July 16, 2002, available at http://www.
citizen.org/documents/UnitedSeniorsAssociationreport.pdf (last visited Jan. 22, 2004).
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at best ambiguous names, these groups often refuse to register as
Political Action Committees ("PACs"), decline to report their ex-
penditures, and do not disclose their donors.3 °
Recently, special interest groups have become more demanding
in their expectations of judges and candidates for judicial office.
They demand answers to substantive questions regarding so-
called judicial philosophy. After last summer's decision in Repub-
lican Party of Minnesota v. White,31 the groups have become very
precise in their expectations: Demand to know the judge or can-
didate's position on the issues that interest you; Hold the judici-
ary's feet to the fire; If a judge "decline[s] to answer... by hiding
behind the political skirts of the Code of Judicial Conduct" then
hold the judge accountable.32 Accountability, in their jargon,
means removal from office.
Not only has the White decision removed the barrier between
judicial office holders and publicly declared viewpoints, it has fur-
ther blurred the fundamental distinction between judicial office
and other elected offices.33 Judges are now free-in fact, I would
suggest many now feel forced-to announce their views on dis-
puted legal and political issues because "'[ilf the State chooses to
tap the energy and the legitimizing power of the democratic proc-
ess, it must accord the participants in that process ... the First
Amendment rights that attach to their roles."'34 This assertion ig-
nores the crucial differences in the roles of judges and the role of
others selected via a democratic process. It turns Justice Frank-
furter's simplistic explanation of the role of judging 5 on its head;
it all but breaks the pendulum from its stem.
In response to White, special interest groups can and will be
more demanding. Judges who refuse to announce their views will
30. David S. Karp, Taxing Issues: Reexamining the Regulation of Issue Advocacy by
Tax-Exempt Organizations Through the Internal Revenue Code, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1805,
1806-09 (2002) (discussing the "stealth-PACs" and Congress's response of requiring regis-
tration with the IRS and disclosure of donors).
31. 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
32. Sid Salter, Ask Candidates in Judicial Races Hard Questions, CLARION-LEADER,
July 17, 2002, at 7A.
33. White, 536 U.S. at 797 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
34. Id. at 788 (quoting Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 349 (1991)).
35. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 525 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("History
teaches that the independence of the judiciary is jeopardized when courts become em-
broiled in the passions of the day and assume primary responsibility in choosing between
competing political, economic and social pressures.").
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be targeted for removal or defeat; and quite naturally, to those
who blend the judiciary with politics, announcement will be ex-
pected to indicate commitment. Judges who have announced their
views will feel pressured to rule in accordance with those views
and to consider their personal views in addition to, or perhaps in-
stead of, the law and the facts. Judicial independence will thus be
threatened not only by outside political forces, but by judges who
abdicate their responsibilities as judges and impose their per-
sonal viewpoints or values.
Since White, other seemingly impenetrable barriers between
judging and "just politics" have crumbled as well. A federal circuit
court has upheld an invalidation of a judicial ethics rule that dis-
allowed judges from soliciting money and endorsements.36 State
court judges in Georgia and presumably throughout the Eleventh
Circuit may now raise money and seek endorsements, just like
other politicians.37 Similarly, another federal court has paved the
way for judges to participate in political activities, invalidating an
ethics rule that prohibited judges from engaging in partisan poli-
tics.3
8
Both decisions exalt, as did the Supreme Court's White major-
ity, the judge's First Amendment rights over his or her constitu-
tional duties.39 In the words of one commentator, the decisions
make judges no more than politicians who wear black robes.4 ° Ju-
dicial decisions will be seen as political, no different from a vote
by a legislator; the integrity of the judiciary will be denigrated
and the public's faith in and respect for the courts will be under-
mined. And as for my pendulum, I fear it will finally break.
36. Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312, 1319-23 (11th Cir. 2002).
37. See id. at 1320-21 (interpreting White as suggesting the same standard for judi-
cial, legislative, and executive elections).
38. Spargo v. N.Y. State Comm'n on Judicial Conduct, 244 F. Supp. 2d 72, 90 (N.D.
N.Y. 2003).
39. See Weaver, 309 F.3d at 1320 ("For fear of violating these broad prohibitions, can-
didates will too often remain silent even when they have a good faith belief that what they
would otherwise say is truthful. This dramatic chilling effect cannot be justified by Geor-
gia's interest in maintaining judicial impartiality and electoral integrity."); see also
Spargo, 244 F. Supp. 2d at 90 ("[Elven in the face of any tradition, a restriction on the core
right to make political speech must be narrowly tailored to meet a compelling state inter-
est.").
40. Paul L. Friedman, Taking the High Road: Civility, Judicial Independence, and the
Rule of Law, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURv. AM. L. 187, 189 (2001).
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It was great Virginians who devised the blueprint for an ideal
democracy: one with three separate and independent branches of
government; one where the politics of governing and the neutral-
ity of judging remained separate; one where judges were insu-
lated from partisanship, special interests, and majority whim. It
was another great Virginian, Chief Justice Harry L. Carrico, who
once wrote in praise of Chief Justice John Marshall that "[h]e
took a federal judiciary, which politicians had sought to make a
subservient handmaiden of the other branches of government,
and gave it the freedom and independence vitally essential to its
existence."4' Justice Carrico said that while James Madison gave
the Constitution a body and George Mason gave it a heart, Jus-
tice Marshall gave it a soul."
I can think of no greater disservice to the legacy of Chief Jus-
tice Harry Carrico, to the brilliant creation of Marshall and Madi-
son and Hamilton, to the soul of the Constitution, than for the
vastly important state courts in this country to become just an-
other political branch of government. Every politician has a
choice-to attempt to politicize the judiciary or to honor the im-
portance of the separate and distinct role of judges in our system
of government. And every judge has a choice-to exercise his or
her First Amendment rights, to further obscure the vast differ-
ences between the role of judges and the role of other government
actors, or to forsake personal freedom for a greater liberty, a last-
ing legacy in America and in Virginia of independent, equal jus-
tice under law, a land where the pendulum symbolizing an inde-
pendent judiciary swings to and fro now and again but swings
steady, secure, and balances the scales of justice nice, clear, and
true.
41. Harry L. Carrico, The Seventeenth Annual Kenneth J. Hodson Lecture: George Ma-
son, John Marshall, and the Constitution, 121 MIL. L. REV. 1, 15 (1988).
42. Id. at 5.
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